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The International Monetary Fund in a new 
international financial constellation: 
An interpretational commentary* 
David H. Pollock and Carlos Massad 
1. A 'new' IMF appears to be just now 
in process of emerging. If so, it will 
probably possess at least four central 
characteristics, namely: (a) it will be 
endowed with a significantly larger 
volume of loanable resources than be-
fore; (b) it will dispense those resources 
as part of a deliberate global policy 
primarily in order to find a way of 
recycling OPEC surpluses more effi-
ciently than before; (c) it will undertake 
those new lending functions with a 
greater degree of 'conditionally' than 
before; and finally, (d) it will be granted 
a greater degree of 'surveillance' autho-
rity in so doing. These judgements stem 
from the following lines of reasoning. 
2. From the time of the 'oil shock' in 
late 1973 to the end of 1976, the OPEC 
countries ran an enormous cumulative 
This 'commentary* reflects the main 
points of an internal discussion held in CEPAL, 
Santiago, in late 1977, during which Mr. David 
H. Pollock (Director of the CEPAL Washington 
Office) expressed his views concerning a 
possible new IMF role in the emerging inter-
national financial and monetary constellation, 
and the potential significance of that role from 
the Latin American angle. After the discussion 
Mr. Pollock, in close collaboration with Mr. 
Carlos Massad, Co-ordinator of UNDP/CEPAL 
Joint Project RLA/77/021, synthesized the 
ideas that had been expressed. Although they 
do not necessarily reflect the views of CEPAL, 
they are being reproduced in the Review in 
order to bring this important issue, which is still 
unfolding, to the attention of a Wider audience 
(Editor's Note). 
current-account surplus of some 145 
billion dollars. One half of this was 
represented, in counterpart, by the 
cumulative current-account deficit of the 
NO PEC developing countries. Indeed, 
their deficit was so large that the total 
outstanding external debt of these de-
veloping countries rose by more than 50 
per cent in 3 years, reaching the very 
large total of around 160 billion dollars 
by December 1976.1 Viewed in aggre-
gative terms, therefore, it is clear that 
the international monetary system is 
now faced with a new and very impor-
tant problem: namely, how to match the 
overall OPEC surplus with the particular 
deficits of individual NOPEC countries, 
developed and developing alike. 
3. Some solutions to this new problem 
have of course already been forthco-
ming. But not in a manner very satisfac-
tory to developing countries. This is 
basically because OPEC countries have 
been depositing their surpluses primarily 
in private banks located in the United 
States and Euro-markets, which, in con-
sequence i became | 'spontaneously' in-
volved in the matching (recycling) 
process. This short note is not the place 
1
 Latin America accounted for approxima-
tely one-half of this total by the end of 1976, 
the countries mainly concerned being Brazil 
and Mexico (54 billion dollars combined) and 
Peru, Argentina and Colombia (26 billion 
dollars combined). By end-1977, the total debt 
of NOPEC developing countries reached around 
180 billion dollars. 
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to assess the costs and benefits of how 
the private banks have handled the glo-
bal recycling process since 1974. What 
should be stressed, however, is that, 
although private banks have handled 
most of the required matching-of-funds, 
they have done so on an essentially 
day-by-day and ad hoc basis. No 
conscious policy framework has been 
brought into play, either by donor or 
recipient governments, or by the private 
banks, and certainly not by the interna-
tional community considered as a whole. 
To repeat, this note was not intended to 
analyse how well or how poorly the 
private banks have carried out the 
post-1973 recycling process. What it 
does wish to stress, however, is that, in 
the absence of any international policy 
framework, the time would inevitably 
come when private banks could not, or 
would not, continue handling so much 
of the global recycling. Clearly, private 
banks cannot indefinitely carry on their 
books the ever-growing debt of all the 
developed countries with weaker balan-
c e s f-payments positions, plus that of 
the developing countries as well. And 
whatever they can do in this regard, they 
cannot maintain their future lending 
volume pari passu with OPEC's huge 
current account surpluses, which have 
averaged around 45 billion dollars per 
year since 1974 and are generally ex-
pected to average nearly 40 billion 
dollars per annum for many years to 
come. Thus it is our opinion that a 
watershed was reached during 1977, 
when private international commercial 
banks were estimated to have held 
roughly one-half of the total outstanding 
debt of all NOPEC developing countries, 
compared to only one-tenth of a much 
smaller debt volume back in 1970. If we 
are correct in such a watershed thesis, 
then debtor NOPEC countries will have 
to turn increasingly to intergovernmental 
channels like IBRD and especially IM F 
to help finance their foreign exchange 
gaps. To these ends the IMF will pre-
sumably have to follow a two-pronged 
approach, consisting in undertaking 
more loans, and of a riskier nature, on 
the one hand, and imposing stricter 
lending prerequisites ('conditionality') 
related to foreign borrowing, on the 
other. In other words, IMF will have to 
deliberately increase its lending volume 
and at the same time it will presumably 
have to urge borrowing NOPF.C govern-
ments to modify the 'inadequate* po-
licies that were contributing to their 
prior balance-of-payments deficits and 
hence their external debt. In even 
blunter language, to the same extent that 
IMF expands its future loans to NOPEC 
developing countries with weaker balan-
ce-of-payments prospects, IMF's condi-
tionality will tend to be more stringent 
than that imposed by private banks since 
the 'oil-shock'. 
4. If all this should come to pass —as we 
believe is likely— it would presume an 
ever-growing fiscal involvement on the 
part of the developed countries in the 
international recycling process; i.e., the 
treasuries of the developed countries 
would in effect be taking up some of the 
slack resulting from the decline in net 
new private bank lending. Furthermore, 
as governments in developed countries 
face up to the prospect of ever-growing 
contributions to IBRD and IMF, there 
will undoubtedly be increasing demands 
for closer scrutiny by the congresses and 
tax-payers in those same developed coun-
tries. The final stage in this entire se-
quence could be growing recriminations 
and strains between nations of the north 
and south, unless things were done diffe-
rently from in the past. 
THE IMF IN A NEW FINANCIAL CONSTELLATION / DM. Pollock and C. Massad 227 
5. Thus, the sequence of events traced 
above might be summarized as follows: 
(i)continuous OPECcurrent account 
surpluses for many years to 
come, generating continuous de-
ficits and thereby an ever-
growing debt on the part of 
NOPEC countries. 
(ii)with private banks handling most 
of the transitional recycling task, 
(iii) until eventually the private banks 
reach a limit of their new net 
lending. 
(iv) in consequence placing more 
pressure on IBRD and especially 
on IMF to take up the slack, 
(v) but with the private banks, 
taxpayers and legislatures in de-
veloped countries insisting on 
growing 'conditionally' in this 
emerging stage of global re-
cycling, and 
(vi) as a final element in this se-
quence, the endowment of IMF 
with greater disciplinary autho-
rity ('hard surveillance'), at least 
in so far as developing countries 
are concerned. 
6. As already mentioned, this sequence 
of events, under way since 1974, has 
been essentially ad hoc and extempo-
raneous in nature. Clearly, therefore, a 
global policy - to transfer more real 
resources to developing countries in the 
long run, and to ensure a smoother 
distribution of global liquidity to both 
developed and developing countries 
in the short run - must eventually emerge: 
Otherwise a cloud will continue han-
ging over the international monetary 
system; a cloud involving a new and 
different sequence of events, such as 
defaults on debt payments by one or 
more developing countries, leading to a 
loss of confidence in the private banking 
system of the western world and thence 
to a slow-down of the rate of growth in 
both developed and developing coun-
tries, and ending with the economic and 
political trauma that would result in the 
latter eventuality. For we cannot reite-
rate too often what we consider to be 
the central reality facing the interna-
tional monetary system today: namely, 
that very large OPEC surpluses will 
continue being generated for many years 
to come. This being so, something will 
have to change. Otherwise the world's 
major banking and trading systems, the 
rates of growth in many developed and 
developing countries, and finally the 
degree of political stability in those 
countries whose growth slows down, 
could all be very seriously affected. This 
may sound unduly dramatic. Yet, given 
the ever-growing degree of interdepen-
dence that characterizes global trade and 
payments, it does not seem to us too 
far-fetched. Hence our stress on the need 
for a deliberate policy that will augment 
long-term real resource transfers from 
developed to developing countries on the 
one hand, while simultaneously facili-
tating shorter-term liquidity transfers 
between OPEC and NOPEC countries on 
the other. If such a policy were to 
evolve, presumably IMF would play an 
important if not the central role therein. 
7. This last is a very interesting con-
clusion from an institutional point of 
view, since, only half a decade ago, the 
Bretton Woods concepts were in disarray 
and the authority and prestige of IMF 
seemed to have significantly dwindled. 
Floating currencies had deprived IMF of 
its long-standing role as manager of the 
international exchange rate system. 
Sudden and large exchange restrictions 
had been imposed by a few major 
developed countries without prior IMF 
consultations. Huge private capital flows 
were occurring outside the IMF frame-
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work. IMF lending resources had be-
come depleted and its lending volume 
had stagnated proportionately. Today, in 
contrast, all this seems on the verge of 
reversal. Private banks in developed 
countries may want to institutionalize 
their loans to developing countries, and 
if so IMF would undoubtedly be their 
preferred institution fordoing so: indeed 
probably their only one. The OPEC 
governments must recycle their vast 
liquid assets, and they will wish to do so 
with both safety and profit. One way 
would be for them to recycle some 
portion of their liquidity through IMF, 
given its guarantees against exchange-rate 
as well as other economic and political 
risks.2 Governments in developed coun-
tries will want a more effective global 
balance-of-paym ents 'surveillance' 
system, since they realize the need for 
ensuring a more effective approach to 
the international adjustment process. 
Thus we see the convergence of recent 
statements by the previous Chairman of 
the United States Federal Reserve 
System, by private transnational banks, 
and by most governments of the G-10 
developed countries, all stressing their 
support for IMF. And thus we see the 
attention being given by Mr. Witteveen 
to finding new ways of revitalizing and 
enlarging the Fund. 
8. What can IMF do in response to these 
new challenges? One answer seems 
clear: it can expand its volume of 
loanable resources. How to do this? A 
number of different approaches might be 
considered. One entails increases in quo-
tas. As mentioned earlier, it is expected 
that a 33 per cent quota expansion will 
2
 Of course, there are other outlets, such as 
direct investment or private portfolio place-
ments, which OPEC countries will wish to use 
for both economic and political reasons. 
be ratified shortly, entailing an increase 
of some SDR 10 billion. Still another 
quota increase is now in process of 
negotiation, though its timing may be 
quite distant.3 A. second approach would 
be for the G-10 industrial countries to 
lend further amounts of hard currencies 
to IMF through the General Agreement to 
Borrow (GAB), as was recently done in 
the case of the United Kingdom Stand-
by of 3.9 billion dollars. Here, however, 
there is a basic shortcoming -from the 
developing countries' point of view— in 
that the GAB is an exclusive lending 
facility available only within the deve-
loped G-10 countries. A third approach 
could be for a new issuance of SDR's. 
However, only SDR 12 billion have been 
issued to date (none since 1972) and the 
possibility of more than a modest new 
SDR issuance currently seems slight. 
Hence the great emphasis that was re-
cently placed on another alternative, 
namely, creation of the new 'Witteveen' 
facility. 
9. Yet useful as this new 'super-tranche' 
facility will be, too much should not be 
expected from it. For one thing it is 
considerably smaller than had originally 
been anticipated. Only a year ago, for 
instance, expectations concerning its size 
had ranged as high as 15 billion dollars 
or even 20 billion. Now it is expected at 
best to total not over 10 billion. Se-
condly, it will involve a structure of 
charges that is expected to be almost 
3
 The amount of the next quota increase is 
still problematic. The developing countries are 
currently talking in terms of a 100 per-cent 
increase, whereas some developed countries are 
understood as wanting one of only 25 per cent. 
The current expectation is of an eventual 
increase of around 50 per cent, which would 
imply a total IMF quota of some SDR 60 billion 
in the future. As mentioned, however, the 
timing of this will probably be some years away. 
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purely commercial. Thirdly, it will ope-
rate separately from although parallel to 
the normal IMF tranche arrangements. 
To put all this another way, the Wit-
teveen Facility places IM F in the role of 
an agent trying to recycle surplus liqui-
dity from OPEC tonon-OPEC countries. 
None the less, the new Facility will 
enable IMF to impose its own forms of 
c o n d i t i onality upon this recycling 
process. And last but by no means least, 
an important indirect effect of this new 
Facility will be to insert Arab countries 
with large balance-of-payments surpluses 
directly into the western monetary sys-
tem. An interesting political issue emerges 
in consequence. The key Arab donor for 
the new Witteveen Facility is Saudi 
Arabia, and its support will undoubtedly 
be linked to an insistence upon very 
conservative measures by those deve-
loping countries drawing upon IMF. In 
short, the new Facility could make IMF 
become, even more than before, a global 
'policeman' acting on behalf of private 
banks, developed countries, and the key 
Arab OPEC donor countries. The central 
emphasis, in short, will be on caution 
and conservatism. 
10. To conclude, IMF seems to be en-
tering upon a new stage of global re-
surgence. Its volume of resources will 
undoubtedly be considerably augment-
ed, mainly through new quota increases 
plus the creation of the new super-
tranche facility. But // will increase its 
conditionality prerequisites, in order to 
safeguard the new resources entrusted to 
it and also to reduce the balance-of-
payments deficits that are assumed to 
arise because of 'inadequate' policies 
applied by NOPEC countries. To such 
ends, it will be given stronger sur-
veillance authority. Here we draw some 
final (and even more conjectural) inter-
pretative conclusions about the signifi-
cance of a 'new' IMF. Future IMF 
surveillance authority will undoubtedly 
be demonstrated by an insistence on 
greater 'internal discipline' within deve-
loping deficit countries: i.e., by the 
placing of stress on more conservative 
domestic monetary, fiscal and invest-
ment policies. But a very important 
related question is this: will IMF also use 
its enhanced surveillance authority to 
urge or compel developed countries with 
a surplus to adjust via appreciated ex-
change rates, larger imports, an expan-
sion of capital outflows, or all three? Or 
will it concentrate its surveillance efforts 
primarily if not solely on developing 
countries with a deficit, as was so often 
the case during the 1950s and 1960s? In 
a nutshell, will IMF become more 
symmetrical than before in its distri-
bution of the costs and benefits deriving 
from global trade and payments? This is 
a very important question for many 
Latin American countries. Their con-
tinued economic growth will require 
continued capital flows. Such flows will, 
in part, come directly from IMF. But 
they will also come from other suppliers 
(such as private banks, IBRD, OECD and 
OPEC governments), each of which in 
turn will be influenced indirectly by IM F 
judgements on the 'adequacy' of na-
tional policies within individual Latin 
American countries. All this suggests 
that stronger surveillance by IMF could, 
if not carefully handled, lead to a revival 
of the old charges of 'interference in 
internal affairs' which were heard so 
often during the 1950s and 1960s and 
which abated in the 1970s. 
11. One last thought. A basic conclusion 
here is that private United States and 
Euro-banks will tend to lend pro-
gressively more to those NOPEC de-
veloping countries that have accepted 
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strong IMF conditionality prerequisites. 
This would, as stated above, be espe-
cially important to Latin American 
countries that rely so extensively on 
funds from private banks. Yet a certain 
contradiction is present in such logic: to 
get money at commercial rates from 
private banks, developing countries will 
have to be in such balance- o f-payments 
straits as to accept strong surveillance. It 
would therefore appear to be desirable 
for the Latin American (and other deve-
loping) countries relying on private 
money to think of new alternatives. One 
might be the CEPAL 'refinancing faci-
lity'. Another might be to contemplate 
the idea of a new and better-balanced 
'country evaluation' process, which 
could include the views not only of one 
agency but rather of several, together 
with those of the government concerned 
and a group of high-level independent 
consultants. In any event, there appears 
to be a clear need, from Latin America's 
point of view, to search for some new 
institutional process that would involve 
greater flexibility in IMF lending and 
borrowing powers on the one hand, 
with the ability to undertake co-
financing with commercial banks on the 
other. In this search, it will be in-
cumbent upon Latin American countries 
to lead the way, since they will have so 
much to gain or lose in the process. 
